

# **RESEARCH REPORT**

## **MAKING PUBLIC CORRUPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA**

### **AN ANALYSIS OF MEDIA REPORTS ON CORRUPTION OVER THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER 2000 - 31 DECEMBER 2001**

**COMPILED BY:**

**C.J. STEENKAMP**

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**CAPE TOWN**

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## TABLE OF CONTENT

	<b>PAGE</b>
1. INTRODUCTION	2
2. METHODOLOGY	2
3. RESULTS	5
3.1. NUMBER OF CASES	5
3.2. TYPES OF CORRUPTION	6
3.3. AGENTS UNCOVERING CORRUPTION	7
3.4. LEVEL AND LOCATION OF CORRUPTION	11
3.5. FOLLOW-UP STEPS TAKEN	16
4. CONCLUSION	19

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

This study focused on newspaper reports of corruption in South Africa over the period November 2000 until December 2001. Since the majority of citizens, including policy makers, report that they receive their information about corruption from the media, it is important to analyse what type of information is in the public realm about corruption.

The purpose was to look at ways in which cases of corruption had been reported in the media over the 14-month period. It was originally intended as a control study of a similar study conducted on articles published during the 17-month period immediately prior to this (June 1999 to October 2000)<sup>1</sup>, but has since adopted a wider focus. The two questions guiding the analysis asked 1) who was most responsible for exposing corruption in South Africa and, 2) what happens once a case of corruption had been uncovered (even if it is only alleged and has not yet been proven)?

A broad definition of corruption was adopted, referring to all cases where a person(s) used their positions of power, influence or access to public resources for their own personal gain. This included activities ranging from accepting bribes in exchange for favours, to nepotism or fraud.

## **2. METHODOLOGY**

The aim of the study was threefold: Firstly, it aimed to identify the individual cases of corruption that the media reported on over the 14-month period. Secondly, it wanted to establish which agent (for example an official process, investigative journalist, civil society actor or whistle-blower) was responsible for bringing the corruption into the public sphere. Lastly, it wanted to identify which agents were called in to take follow-up steps on these now public cases of, often only alleged, corruption.

A total of 1705 articles from the South African print media published over the period in question, were analysed. The articles were assembled by the SA Media Service based at the University of the Free State and included reports by 25 sources in the South African print media. This included all the national and provincial newspapers and articles appeared in English and Afrikaans.

The information was logged onto an Excel worksheet into several categories. Altogether there were 12 categories. For all cases the following information was included:

■ **Number given to an article**

These range from 1 – 268 and provide easy reference to cases. Articles were arranged according to dates.

■ **The date of the article in which the case was first reported.**

Only individual instances of corruption that were reported on by the media for the FIRST time in the period under consideration were included. Reports on follow-up steps on older (i.e. pre-November 2000) cases, or new developments in such “older” cases (for example, the R43 billion- government arms deal on which new information on bribery or irregularities came to light over a period of months) were not counted.

■ **The source of the above article**

This refers to the newspaper in which the article was published.

■ **A brief description of the case**

■ **The agent responsible for making the corruption public.**

This category refers to the way in which corruption was exposed, leading to media reports. This could have four values: official processes; investigative journalists; civil society or whistleblowers. The analysis was heavily dependent upon the information provided by the media. It can be well conceived that, in some instances, another agent, such as a whistleblower, brought the corruption to the attention of the authorities before it was brought to the attention by the media. For example, a whistleblower within the SAPS could have alerted the SAPS anti-corruption unit to the irregularities. However, if it was through the anti-corruption unit that the incident was made public in the media, the SAPS anti-corruption unit – and not the whistleblower - will be logged as the agent responsible for making the corruption public. The media mostly does not provide information (conceivably because they do not have access to it) about such whistleblowers.

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<sup>1</sup> See Landman, J.P. 2001. “Corruption – not a one way street” in *Beeld*, 25 March 2001.

■ **The follow-up steps taken (either internal or external, or both)**

If the corruption took place within state structures, the following additional information was logged:

- **The level** (national, provincial or local) within the state machinery where the corruption occurred.
- **The location** (referring to the department or parastatal, for example) of the corruption
- **Information on previous incidents of corruption** within the body named in the previous category, if this information was mentioned in the articles.

An example of a case of corruption within state structures has been logged as follows:

Number		28
Date of article		4 Jan 01
Source of article		Pretoria News
Description of case		Commander and two staff members of Ga-Rankuwa Murder and Robbery unit accused of accepting R2000 bribe to release two murder suspects.
Corruption within state structures	Level of corruption	National
	Location (Department)	SAPS, Police station in North West
	Corruption track record	
Agent responsible for exposing corruption	Official process (specify)	SAPS Anti-corruption unit
	Investigative journalism	
	Civil Society	
	Whistleblowers	
Follow-up steps taken	Internal	Suspended without pay
	External (specify)	CJS

### **3. RESULTS**

The analysis was carried out in the period 1 May 2002 to 15 June 2002. The following sections set out the major findings, organised according to the categories on the log sheet.

#### **3.1. Number of cases:**

The print media reported on altogether 268 individual “new” cases of corruption in the period November 2000 to December 2001 (inclusive). These cases were classified into two categories: Firstly, instances where corruption took place within the public sector (also referred to as state structures). This includes corruption within government departments (national or provincial), local municipalities, parastatals and incidents where judges or magistrates were involved (they form part of the broader judicial sphere.) In this category 239 cases were logged.

Secondly, there were instances where the corruption took place in the private sector or civil society, such as political parties or community organisations. In this category 29 cases were logged.

This report, however, is mostly concerned with the cases of corruption that took place within state structures and will therefore focus on the analysis of data in that category. The study hopes to shed light on the ability of, specifically, the state to detect and deal with corruption within its own ranks.

It should be remembered that, whilst 268 individual cases of corruption were reported in the South African media over a 14-month period, one cannot conclude that only 268 cases of corruption occurred in South African during this time. The results of this study will also propose some answers to the questions: What makes a case of corruption appear in the print media? Why have these cases come to light, and not others? What makes a case of corruption newsworthy?

### **3.2 Types of corruption**

A table relating the nature of the crimes which landed in the public sphere, is constructed based on the descriptions of each case. These broad categories of crimes are fraud, bribery, corruption in general (this includes cases where the media reports did not specify the nature of the offence, or cases where two or more of the other crimes named here, were committed simultaneously), mismanagement, theft, nepotism, a severe conflict of interest (such as cases where an official has strong business interests in a company which had won a contract with the official's department) and money laundering.

**TABLE 1**

*Types of corruption uncovered within the public sector*

<b>Code<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Type of corruption</b>	<b>No. of cases</b>	<b>% of 239</b>
2	Bribery	78	32.6%
3	Corruption in general	71	29.7%
1	Fraud	29	12%
4	Mismanagement	20	8.3%
5	Theft	18	7.5%
6	Nepotism	11	4.6%
7	Conflict of interest	11	4.6%
8	Money laundering	1	0,4%
	<b><i>TOTAL</i></b>	<b><i>239</i></b>	<b><i>100%</i></b>

The above table shows that 32.6% of cases reported refer explicitly to bribery. These are followed closely by corruption in general, where 71 cases (29.7%) are reported. Other corruption related crimes, which received media attention are fraud (12%), mismanagement (8.3%), theft (7.5%), nepotism (4.6%), conflict of interest (4.6%) and money laundering (0.4%).

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<sup>2</sup> The column named "Code" contains the coding value awarded to each category (as stated in the next column) on the original data-spreadsheets. Therefore, the numbers in this column are not necessarily in descending order. This is the case with all the tables in this report.

### **3.3. Agents responsible for uncovering corruption**

#### **3.3.1 Within state structures**

The exposure of corruption is important, because once cases of corruption come into the public arena there is an assumption that the glare of publicity may put pressure on public officials to deal with the corruption in question.<sup>3</sup> One example from the dataset of this clearly happening, is the case of the KwaZulu Natal MEC for Housing who evacuated his mansion for a more modest dwelling after revelations by a newspaper about the extravagant monthly rent of R22 500, which the taxpayer is paying<sup>4</sup>.

The breakdown of agents responsible for exposing corruption within the public sector, were as follows:

**TABLE 2**

*Agents responsible for uncovering corruption in state structures*

<b>Agent</b>	<b>No. of cases</b>	<b>% of 239</b>
Official processes	144	60.2%
Civil society	44	18.4%
Whistleblowers	31	13.0%
Investigative journalism	20	8.4%
<b><i>TOTAL</i></b>	<b><i>239</i></b>	<b><i>100%</i></b>

In the overwhelming majority of cases (60% or 144 instances), corruption was exposed through official processes. These processes are instituted, maintained and controlled by the state. (A further breakdown of the nature of these processes can be found in table 2.1.) Civil society was responsible for uncovering 18 % (44 cases) of the exposed corruption, whistleblowers for 13 % (31 cases) and investigations by journalists for a mere 8% (20 cases.)

The state is clearly the agent most responsible for bringing corruption within its own ranks into the public sphere. However, it should still be remembered that it is not known how much

<sup>3</sup> The Public Service Accountability Monitor at Rhodes University had developed an innovative methodology which follows up on newspaper reports on corruption in the Eastern Cape to make sure that public officials in that province are held accountable once allegations of corruption have come to light. Visit their website at [www.psam.ru.ac.za](http://www.psam.ru.ac.za).

<sup>4</sup> Case 3 on the data sheet.



corruption remains hidden. What is important to note is that the official processes in place are indeed able to pick up corruption.

▪ **Corruption brought to light by official processes**

The 144 cases made public by official processes can be broken into further categories, which will shed light on the specific nature of these state-generated and controlled processes.

**TABLE 2.1**

*Official processes exposing corruption*

Code	Category	No. of cases	% of 144
1	Internal departmental investigation	72	50%
3	External reports	28	19.4%
4	SAPS investigation	26	18%
5	Others	11	7.6%
2	CJS (Criminal Justice System)	7	4.8%
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100</b>

In this breakdown, 50% of cases (72 of 144) came to the attention of the public through the media following a departmental investigation. The first category includes investigations by the SAPS Anti-corruption unit, because these are investigations by the Police into irregularities within their own ranks. Other examples of processes in this category include internal audit reports, cases highlighted in speeches by the MEC or Minister, and departmental anti-corruption drives.

In the second instance, 28 cases (19.4%) were exposed by external reports, generated by actors **outside the department** where the corruption took place. Examples of such actors are the Auditor-general, outside bodies such as the Automobile Association and other departments.

In a further 26 cases (18%), the SAPS was responsible for making corruption public. This category only includes **investigations** (whether by the Scorpions or another divisions of the Police Service) into irregularities, which could then be followed with actions by the Criminal Justice System (CJS) (which includes arrests and court cases) at a later stage. Corruption, which was reported on before a suspect was arrested or brought to court (i.e. before the case entered the CJS) , fell into this category.

Eleven cases were uncovered through joint operations by two or more of any of the above-mentioned actors and were placed in the category “others”. Often corruption would only become public after a joint investigation by the Scorpions and the Auditor-general, for example.

In the last category, where the media picked up on corruption only **after** the case had entered the CJS, 7 cases, (4.8% of all reports) were logged. These cases were thus reported on after arrests or court appearances had been made.

#### ▪ **Corruption brought to light by civil society**

The category of actors responsible for uncovering the second largest number of corruption cases, was civil society. Civil society also consists of a variety of actors, existing within the sphere between the state and the family. The following table sets out the number of cases exposed by the various actors in the civil society sphere.

**TABLE 2.2.**

*Civil society actors exposing corruption*

<b>Code</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>No of cases</b>	<b>% of 44</b>
2	Community and interest groups	23	52%
1	Political party	10	23%
3	Trade Unions	9	20%
4	Individual in positions in community	2	5%
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100%</b>

The majority of cases here (24) were made public by community and interest groups. These range from community groups concerned about housing allocation, to formal associations such as the SA Gun Owner’s Association.

Ten of the 44 cases exposed by civil society was the result of allegations voiced in public by various political parties. In this respect, the Democratic Alliance was by far the most vocal, making public allegations of 6 instances of corruption. Interestingly, the ANC youth league, despite their strong links with the governing party and therefore expected access to officials to

pressure them into putting official processes in place, was responsible for bringing one case directly to the media's attention.

Formal trade unions were responsible for exposing 9 cases and individuals in influential positions within the civil society sphere, such as a prominent businessperson or director of a training institution, exposed 2 cases.

### 3.3.2 Within private sector and civil society

The analysis has shown that official processes were also the agent most successful in exposing corruption in the private sector and civil society. Here official processes exposed 12 cases (41.4%), whistleblowers exposed 9 cases (31%), civil society made five cases public (17.3%) and investigating journalists three cases (10.3%).

However, the gap between the success of whistleblowers (31%) and official processes (41%) in exposing corruption is much smaller than is the case with corruption in the public sector where whistleblowers uncovered a mere 13%. There is a possible explanation for this observation: the state-generated official processes uncovering corruption in the state machinery probably often act on tip-offs by whistleblowers within these departments. The corruption thus only became public through the state's public relations capacity, which related it to the media. In the private and civil society sectors, whistleblowers often have to speak directly to the media, since the intermediary processes and mechanisms are not yet in place.

**TABLE 3**

*Agents responsible for uncovering corruption in private sector and civil society*

<b>Agent</b>	<b>No. of cases</b>	<b>% of 29</b>
Official processes	12	41.4%
Whistleblowers	9	31.0%
Civil society	5	17.3%
Investigative journalism	3	10.3%
<b><i>TOTAL</i></b>	<b><i>29</i></b>	<b><i>100%</i></b>

### **3.4. Level and location of corruption**

The following analysis is based only on the incidents of corruption that took place within the public sector.

#### **▪ Level of corruption**

Corruption in the public sector can take place on various levels: national, provincial or local. Individual incidents of corruption are categorised into one of these levels, based on the level of authority under which the perpetrators were employed. In all instances of corruption on a national level, the incident took place within national state departments or the national headquarters of parastatals, such as Telkom. Corruption involving police officers at local police stations were classified under ‘national SAPS’, because of the national command structure of the SAPS. Corruption in provincial departments were logged on the provincial level and corruption in all sections that fall under the authority of a municipality were classified as local.

**TABLE 4**

*Levels within state structures where corruption was uncovered*

<b>Level within state structures</b>	<b>No. of cases</b>	<b>% of 239</b>
National	99	41%
Provincial	83	35%
Local	50	21%
No level specified	7	3%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>100%</b>

According to this breakdown, reported corruption occurred mainly at national level (41%) followed by provincial (35%) and local (21%) levels. In seven of these cases the perpetrators were magistrates or judges who are supposedly independent from the state. Corruption thus took place within the broader judicial sphere and not within a government department as such. However, one could argue that, although these actors are not within a specific department, they do fall under the authority of other national bodies such as the Magistrate’s Commission that regulate their conduct. In this view, they can be classified on the ‘national’ level, which would increase that amount from 99 to 106 (44% of all cases).

A similar study<sup>5</sup>, commissioned by Transparency International and executed by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), analysed 1358 articles on corruption (that occurred nationally and internationally) in the period January 1999 to June 1999. They found that most of corruption took place on local level (35%), with provincial (34%) and national (27%) levels following. This is the inverse from this study's findings. However, the different definitions adopted by the two studies, can explain this contradiction. The Transparency International study assigned instances of corruption to the various levels on the basis of the geographical position of the crime. If the crime took place in a certain province and its effect was limited to that province, it was classified under "provincial". In this study, cases were assigned to the various levels, based on the structure of authority under which that crime was committed. Therefore, where this study would classify all cases of police corruption on the national level (as explained previously), the Transparency International study would classify cases of police corruption according to the geographical location of the police station where the crime took place.

#### ▪ **Location of corruption**

The focus can be shifted slightly to highlight the location of the irregularity by grouping all the cases into sectors. These sectors include cases from all three levels of the state - local, provincial or national. A case of housing irregularities by officials in a municipality (thus taking place at the local level) would be placed in the same Housing Sector as fraud committed by an official in the National Department of Housing, which falls on the national level.

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<sup>5</sup> Research report. Transparency South Africa. 2000. Corruption and Good Governance: A media profile. Published by Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE).

**TABLE 5**  
*Corruption in state sectors*

<b>Code</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>No. of cases</b>	<b>% of 239</b>
5	Police, Safety and Security	34	14.2%
9	Transport and Traffic	26	10.9%
1	Housing	20	8.4%
8	Public Works and Enterprise	20	8.4%
14	Education	20	8.4%
21	Legislature/ Council	17	7.1%
4	Health	16	6.6%
6	Justice	16	6.6%
2	Correctional Services and Prisons	12	5%
13	Finance	9	3.8%
15	Welfare and Social Work	8	3.3%
22	Office of the Premier/President	8	3.3%
10	Home Affairs	7	2.9%
3	Environment and Tourism	5	2.1%
19	Agriculture	5	2.1%
7	Trade and Industry	4	1.7%
12	Telecommunications	4	1.7%
17	Sport	3	
20	Culture, Arts and Science	2	
11	Labour	1	
16	Mineral and Energy	1	
18	Defence	1	
	<b><i>TOTAL</i></b>	<b>239</b>	

Altogether 22 sectors were identified. Many of these divisions between sectors are clear-cut, but explanatory comments on the delimitation of the boundaries of some sectors are necessary. Over and above the obvious cases where officials within specific government departments were the perpetrators, some sectors include additional actors.

- The Health sector includes corruption within ambulance services, as well as in hospitals and in the various health departments (whether at national or provincial level).
- The Police, Safety and Security sector includes all cases of corruption, often such as bribery, that took place in Police stations where police officers were involved.
- The Justice sector also includes irregularities perpetrated by magistrates and judges (who do not fall directly under the Department of Justice).
- Corruption concerning the awarding of general contracts by Tender boards etc. (which are not within a specific department) also fall under the Public Works and Enterprise sector.
- The Transport and Traffic sector includes drivers' licences scams and acts of corruption perpetrated by traffic officials.
- Irregularities in the South African Revenue Service, as well as the payment of 'ghost' workers where various departments are involved, are grouped under the Finance sector.
- Lastly, the sector for Legislatures and Councils includes acts perpetrated by members of these bodies in their capacity as members.

Table 5 shows that the Police, Safety and Security sector had the most cases (34 cases or 14.2%) of corruption that were made public. Other sectors with high scores are Transport and Traffic (26 cases or 10.9%), Housing (20 cases), Public Works and Enterprise (20 cases) and Education (20 cases) or 8.4% each.

The relatively high score for the Police, Safety and Security sector could be attributed to the effectiveness of the SAPS anti-corruption unit in making public corruption within its own ranks.

▪ **Corruption at provincial level**

A further breakdown of corruption on the provincial level (table 5), reveals the Eastern Cape (with 25 cases) as the one province where the most corruption at the provincial level was exposed, followed by KwaZulu-Natal with 19 cases.<sup>6</sup>

**TABLE 6**  
*Corruption in provinces*

Province	No. of cases	% of 83
Eastern Cape	25	30%
KwaZulu Natal	19	23%
Gauteng	10	12%
Northern Province (Limpopo)	9	11%
Mpumalanga	7	8%
North West province	5	6%
Western Cape	4	5%
Free State	3	4%
Northern Cape	1	1%
TOTAL	83	100

<sup>6</sup> It must be remembered that this only refers to corruption within provincial structures. Irregularities within traffic departments and local councils, which may have been reported more frequently in the other provinces, were not classified as falling on the 'provincial' level.



### **3.5 Follow-up steps taken**

The state could respond to reports of corruption in two ways. Firstly, it could deal with it internally. In this response, the body (e.g. department) where the corruption occurred could appoint a departmental investigation into the matter or charge the suspects to appear in front of a disciplinary hearing. The other option is to request external agents to follow the matter up. These agents are external to the department or unit where the corruption was detected, but can still fall under the broader umbrella of the state. (A breakdown of the variety of external agents called upon is provided in table 8.)

**TABLE 7**

*Follow-up steps taken in response to corruption within state structures*

<b>Follow-up steps</b>	<b>No. of cases<sup>7</sup></b>
External	113
Internal	94
No action taken	57

Sometimes one case of corruption would elicit an internal departmental investigation, as well as an external agent to investigate. In 57 instances of corruption (this is 23.8% of the total 239 cases included in this study), no follow-up steps were logged due to the absence of such information in the news reports. In some cases newspaper reports did not stipulate whether any follow-up steps had been taken. In other cases, these steps could have been taken and been appropriately been reported on, albeit in the period after December 2001, which then falls outside the scope of this study.

In the cases where follow-up steps were reported to have been taken, it is clear that bringing an external agent in to take charge of the matter is the favourite response. However, again a word of caution: Sometimes irregularities only became public after an internal investigation had been instituted in response to rumours of such irregularities. In these cases, the internal investigation, which had lead to the exposure of corruption, would be classified as the ‘official process’ exposing corruption, rather than as the immediate follow-up step. Table 2.1, which had set out

<sup>7</sup> It is therefore important to notice that, due to the double responses elicited by some single instances of corruption, the sum of the amounts in the column of table 7 will NOT equal the total number of cases in this study (239 cases).

the nature of official processes, showed that departmental investigations exposed 50% of corruption incidents. This, coupled with the relatively high number of internal responses to corruption, shows a high level of action taken by government departments and state structures themselves towards corruption in their own ranks.

A variety of external agents were called in to deal with or investigate alleged corruption. Many cases had already been referred to the criminal justice system, where arrests or court appearances had been made, by the time the corruption became known. In such cases the external follow-up steps were classified as Criminal Justice System (CJS), thus indicating that the case (and perpetrators) has entered the machinery of the official criminal justice system, consisting of an arrest, a following court appearance and court case.

The following table is a breakdown of the number of cases referred to each external agent.

**TABLE 8**

*External agents dealing with corruption in the state structures*

<b>Code</b>	<b>External Agent</b>	<b>No. of Cases</b>	<b>% of 113</b>
1	Criminal Justice System (CJS) and Police	88	78%
2	Directorate of Public Prosecution, National Prosecution Authority	7	6%
3	Scorpions	7	6%
7	Other department to investigate	4	4%
4	Auditor -general	2	2%
5	External auditors/ external bodies	2	2%
6	Public Protector	2	2%
8	Heath Commission	1	0.9%
	<b><i>TOTAL</i></b>	<b><i>113</i></b>	

The official Criminal Justice System (CJS) is by far the most popular external body for referring corruption in the public sector to. In these 88 cases (78%), arrests or court appearances have already been made by the time it was reported, or shortly after being reported. In a further seven cases each (6%), the Scorpions specifically and the Public Prosecutor were asked to investigate.

When looking at the follow-up steps taken in relation to each agent responsible for making corruption public, we see the following correlations:

**TABLE 9<sup>8</sup>**

*Follow-up steps taken in response to corruption made public by various agents*

Exposing agent	No. of cases	Internal follow-up steps	% of cases per agent	External follow-up steps	% of cases per agent	No action taken	% of cases per agent
Official processes	144	50	35%	88	61%	22	15%
Civil Society	44	21	48%	11	25%	16	36%
Whistleblowers	31	12	39%	11	35%	12	39%
Investigative Journalism	20	11	55%	3	15%	7	35%
TOTAL	239	94		113		57	

Exposures through official processes were followed by internal steps in 50 cases (35%) and external steps in 88 cases (61%). In 22 (15%) cases no follow-up action was taken. Exposures by investigative journalists elicited an internal response in 55% (11) of the cases and an external response in only 15% (3) of the cases. In 35% (7) of the cases no action was taken. Internal steps were taken in response to 21 (48%) of the cases made public by civil society, external steps followed exposure in 11 (25%) of these cases and inaction followed on 16 (36%) of these cases. Lastly, corruption exposed by whistleblowers were reacted upon by internal follow-up steps in 12 (39%) cases, external steps in 11 (35%) of the cases and no action was taken in 12 (39%) of the cases.

The results show that, with the only exception of corruption exposed by official processes, exposures by all other agents were met with more internal follow-up steps than other action (or

inaction). Exposures through official processes elicited the greatest number of external follow-ups, but that could be attributed to the fact that internal processes had exposed many cases to start with, and that even further internal follow-up steps were deemed to be of little use.

#### **4. CONCLUSIONS**

The original aim of this study was to find out to what extent it confirms the findings of the previous 1999-2000 study. That first study found that in the period June 1999 to October 2000 (inclusive) 167 instances of corruption was reported in the media for the first time. In 75% of these cases the exposure was the result of official processes, 11% by investigative journalists, 10% by civil society and 4% by whistleblowers.

The following table 10 compares the two sets of results:

**TABLE 10**

*Comparison of 2000 and 2002 study*

<b>Agent uncovering corruption</b>	<b>2000 study</b>	<b>2002 study</b>
Official processes	125 (75%)	144 (60.2%)
Civil society	16 (10%)	44 (18.4%)
Whistleblowers	7 (4%)	31 (13.0%)
Investigative Journalism	19 (11%)	20 (8.4%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>167 (100)%</b>	<b>239 (100%)</b>

Although the numbers differ, official processes were also in this 2002 study by a clear majority (60%) the agent most responsible for uncovering corruption. Civil society (18%) was in the second place (as opposed to investigative journalism in the previous study), whistleblowers third (13%) and investigative journalism (8%) responsible for bringing least cases to the media's attention. There is a remarkable increase (almost 10%) from the 2000 study in the success of whistleblowers to make public irregularities within the state machinery.

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<sup>8</sup> Due to some instances of corruption eliciting both an internal and external response, the sum of the amounts in the horizontal rows (in columns # 3, 5 and 7) will not equal the totals for that category (as indicated in column # 2).

Media reporting of corruption was not this study's chief focal point, but it rather used media reports as a source of information. However, some conclusions regarding media reporting of corruption can be drawn. Firstly, the South African print media are willing partners of the government in making corruption public. Most newspapers widely reported specific statements or revelations by departments concerning corruption in their ranks, at the time. Secondly, the media is ineffective in tracking cases of corruption once they have become public, except in cases where high profile individuals are involved. The media would thus report on corruption exposed, but then produce no follow-up reporting on events after the exposure. Questions such as did the case go to court, was the perpetrator found guilty and sentenced, remain largely unanswered.<sup>9</sup> Thirdly, reporters seldom refer to the specific department's past experiences (or 'track record') with corruption when writing about a new irregularity. Including this information in newspaper reports could be useful for the public to keep track of the government's general performance regarding corruption and to contextualise "new" individual instances of corruption.

And lastly, coming back to one of the questions asked earlier in the report: What makes the media report on some instances of corruption and not on others? According to the analysis, investigative journalists are the agents least likely to expose corruption. On the other hand, the state is overwhelmingly the most successful agent in making public sector corruption public through official processes, which are then reported on by the media. This raises the possible existence of a wide-spread culture of so-called "press-release" journalism, where the media are largely unwilling (or unable) to expose corruption pro-actively and on own initiative, preferring to wait for a cue from the state.

The analysis has shown that the South African state is largely responsible for bringing corruption within its own structures to light and also in following up these instances of corruption (whether by their own mechanisms or commissioning an external agent) once it has become public. However, there exist doubts regarding the effectiveness and pro-activeness of the South African media in their reporting of corruption in the public sector.

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<sup>9</sup> This is illustrated by the 57 cases ( 24 % of all 239 cases logged) where no follow-up steps were reported.